8 Comments
Jul 24, 2022Liked by Admired Leadership

Thanks for putting this concept out there and critically examining it. Platitudes and theories-- even well accepted ones such as the once-embraced US Military theory of Effects Based Operations sometimes fall apart on examination or turn out not to be doable in a particular bureaucracy.

Sometimes a competing theory that is not as good works better in the environment, e.g., early attempts at Electric cars before Lithium ion batteries, and cryptocurrency before wide scale adoption of blockchain technology.

I never understood my Navy buddies dining protocols when I was in the Army. In the Army leaders always ate last when in the field, and we had to regularly sample food in the mess hall to be sure it was acceptable. In the Navy the Captain has his own private meals apart from others on the ship. And his subordinates generally eat better than their subordinates and better than the skipper. One of these exhibits servant leadership and the others something else that is apparently more suitable to that environment.

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Jul 27, 2022Liked by Admired Leadership

The wiki on this was an interesting read.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effects-based_operations

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author

Thanks, Tim, that is good background.

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Jul 25, 2022Liked by Admired Leadership

Hi Max, what, in your opinion, was the chief undoing of the theory of Effects Based Operations?

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Jul 25, 2022Liked by Admired Leadership

The chief proponent of EBO was the Joint Forces Command, which was dismantled in a bid to reduce the number of major commands and general officers in the joint force. Without the support of that headquarters as a proponent, support, and teaching system the amount of analysis needed to support EBO and system of systems analysis became unworkable. At the same time many began to critique the process, some very high level and respected general officers such as General Van Riper and General Fastabend were among its critics. They criticized EBO for leaving the art out of warfare and relying on the scientific method too heavily— essentially for ignoring the qualitative features of warfare, the art of war, and for relying too much on an Air Force centric approach. Moreover, they thought it didn’t work as advertised and was internally inconsistent with itself in places. Chiefly, EBO collapsed under its own weight in my opinion and was finished off by sharp critiques from prominent generals.

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By "it's own weight" do you mean that it was too much data? too much theory? not practical enough to work in real time?

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Jul 25, 2022·edited Jul 25, 2022Liked by Admired Leadership

I guess closest to the third suggestion that you're making. EBO became so onerous and burdensome in practice that it could not overcome inertia. That is, getting all of the Combatant Commands and Warfighting Commands to adopt those practices, and then sustaining the intellectual challenges to EBO without sufficient data to suggest that it was an improvement over the older systems caused it to collapse. EBO required more proof than it could offer to skeptical critics.

In change management terms, it failed to be fully implemented because it failed to be fully accepted, and the bureaucratic structures that were meant to drive it into practice were dismantled for other political reasons.

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What an excellent post! It’s an AND, not an OR.

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